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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Neoliberals advocate for “marketization,” but the transition to markets in 
pervasively regulated fields like health, defense, and education is complex. 
There is no way out but through. The state itself must capitulate to (and 
coordinate) its subjects’ purported emancipation from it.1 Thus a paradox 
threatens the coherence of the thought of neoliberals. Wealth accumulation up 
to now, they assert, has been distorted by various ill-considered or malicious 
state interventions. Reform is imperative. But the past maldistribution of wealth 
biases the present political playing field: tycoons who won crony capitalist 
favors in the past are going to use those gains to influence future elections, and 
in particular the future terms of marketization. So the neoliberal doubles down 
publicly: as the contemporary political economist of laissez-faire, he insists that 
legislative, regulatory, and cognitive capture just prove that the state needs to 
be shrunk. Left un- (or less) spoken are the more critical questions: What parts 
of the state are to shrink? And what is to be maintained, or grown, as the 
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 1.  PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS GO TO WASTE:  HOW NEOLIBERALISM 
SURVIVED THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 69 (2013). Therein, Mirowski documents the neoliberal 
pattern of  
hav[ing] it both ways: to stridently warn of the perils of expanding purview of state activity 
while simultaneously imagining the strong state of their liking rendered harmless…; to posit 
their ‘free market’ as an effortless generator and conveyor belt of information while 
simultaneously strenuously and ruthlessly prosecuting a ‘war of ideas’ on the ground; asserting 
their program would lead to unfettered economic growth and advanced human welfare while 
simultaneously suggesting that no human mind could ever really know any such thing.  
Id. 
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guarantor of a new market order? 
Beneath the surface of state versus market rhetoric, the U.S. political 
economy increasingly features battles between combined state-market sectors 
over their respective shares of profits and power.2 As these “battles of the 
sectors” wear on, one critical player—health care—appears to be on the verge 
of an unconditional surrender in the marketplace of ideas. The imperative to 
cut health care costs has become a background assumption in health law and 
policy. It is something that not just nearly all mainstream economists, but all 
serious policymakers, whatever their political views, tend to accept as a basic 
ground of informed discourse. If health care has, as former acting director of 
the Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Donald Berwick 
maintains, a “triple aim” of quality, access, and cost control, it appears that the 
last imperative is primus inter pares.3 Cost-cutting is a standard that liberals and 
conservatives, libertarians and progressives are eager to rally around. In a 
policy landscape riddled with irreconcilable differences over fundamental 
values, cost-cutting is a unifying theme. 
The critical question, though, is how to cut health care costs. Beneath the 
superficial consensus that “health care is too expensive,” there are raging 
debates on strategies of cost containment. Some favor supply-side limits: for 
example, reducing the quantity or price of providers. Others focus on the 
demand side: how to reduce expenditures on health care (by, say, removing the 
tax exemption for employer-provided health insurance or imposing taxes on 
certain insurance). A growing “quality movement” argues that “pay for 
performance” will reduce costs by shifting spending to effective interventions, 
and away from wasteful ones. 
How much should our society spend on health care? That is a deep and 
difficult, political and economic (and fundamentally politico-economic) 
question.4 Yet it ought to be addressed before policymakers point to high health 
care spending in itself as a rationale for reducing the purchasing power of 
patients, reducing compensation of physicians, nurses, and other providers, or 
deterring investment in hospitals, drugs, and devices. 
Even if policymakers frankly accept a health expenditures goal along the 
lines of “the same percentage of GDP as other advanced industrial economies,” 
there is critical conceptual work to be done before pursuing it. Before imposing 
 
 2.  As Grewal and Purdy explain in their introduction to this issue, “The questions that 
neoliberalism addresses, then, are not ‘how much market,’ or ‘how much governance,’ but which 
interests will enjoy protection. . . .” David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and 
Neoliberalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 8–9.  
 3.  See Donald M. Berwick, et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 
759–69 (2008).  
 4.  For a definition of political economy and its relevance to law, see Frank Pasquale, Capital’s 
Offense: Law’s Entrenchment of Inequality (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (2014)), BOUNDARY 2 REVIEW, Oct. 1, 2014, at 2, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520251.  
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blunt instruments of cost containment like vouchers and changed tax treatment 
of insurance, policymakers need to evaluate which subsectors within the health 
sector are undervalued and which are overvalued. It makes little sense to aspire 
to cut health expenditures in general, particularly if those that are now absent, 
undersupplied, or undercompensated are worth, in the aggregate, more than the 
waste now being paid for. Far too many policy discussions proceed on the 
assumption that (1) waste is easy to identify, (2) once identified, there are tools 
available to deter spending on it, and (3) deterring spending on waste will lead 
to reallocation of that spending to either worthier health spending, or worthier 
spending in the economy as a whole. Only on rare occasions do all these 
assumptions clearly hold. 
To develop a more rigorous approach to cost containment, this essay 
proceeds as follows: Part II examines the fundamental conflict that cost-
containment papers over—namely, whether American health expenditure 
exceptionalism is a result of inadequate or excessive implementation of 
marketization and the profit motive. Parts III and IV call for a more textured 
analysis of health care expenditures to encourage a revaluation of aspects of 
health care that are now scarce (thanks in part to inadequate compensation for 
them). Part V concludes with some reflections on how winners of past conflicts 
on health care governance parlay money into power (and power into money). 
They have shaped a consensus for cost-cutting while obscuring the many ways 
their dominance has impeded quality of care and access to medicine and may 
raise costs in the future. 
II 
MARKETS AS CURE OR CAUSE OF U.S. HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
EXCEPTIONALISM? 
 American health care is uniquely expensive.5 For example, U.S. doctors may 
be overeager to deploy advanced imaging technology. Others spread the blame, 
lamenting an insufficient evidence base for a surprisingly high percentage of 
care. In her book Overtreated, Shannon Brownlee argues that the U.S. health 
care system spends “between one fifth and one third of our health care 
dollars . . . on care that does nothing to improve our health.”6 Brownlee’s 
 
 5.  Jonathan S. Skinner, The Costly Paradox of Health-Care Technology, in Business Reports: A 
Cure for Health-Care Costs, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept 5. 2013), available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/518876/the-costly-paradox-of-health-care-technology.  
Unlike many countries, the U.S. pays for nearly any technology (and at nearly any price) 
without regard to economic value. For this reason, since 1980, health-care spending as a 
percentage of gross domestic product has grown nearly three times as rapidly in the United 
States as it has in other developed countries, while the nation has lagged behind in life-
expectancy gains. 
Id.   
 6.  SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY TOO MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING US SICKER 
AND POORER 27 (2008). 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, dozens of common treatments, including the 
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careful work builds on health services research that suggests a number of places 
where American health systems could improve outcomes while cutting costs. 
On the other hand, there are certain convenient narratives about American 
costs that need to be debunked. For example, some scolds claim excess 
utilization of health care in the United States is driving costs. But Americans do 
not use more physician or hospital services than, say, the Germans or the 
French (both nations with significantly lower per capita health expenditures).7 
Rather, the most significant culprit behind exorbitant health care costs is high 
prices, not overutilization. As one study showed, the “[p]rice of professional 
services, drugs and devices, and administrative costs, not demand for services or 
aging of the population, produced 91 percent of [health care] cost increases 
since 2000.”8 Doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceutical firms all make more money 
in the United States than in any other comparable country.9 Advocates for 
single-payer, nationalized health care have pointed out that the United States’ 
per capita public spending on health care would pay for all per capita health 
spending in nearly any other advanced industrial nation.10 Drugs, devices, 
hospital services, and the time of most physicians are markedly more expensive 
in the United States than in most of Europe.11 
A naïve defense of U.S. health costs might simply take the high prices as 
evidence that Americans prefer to allocate the per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) that the United States produces, beyond that produced in 
similar countries, on health care. For example, in 2012, the United States’ per 
capita GDP was $51,689; it was only $41,923 in Germany and $42,114 in 
Canada.12 In 2011, per capita health expenditures in the three countries were 
 
tonsillectomy, the hysterectomy, the frontal lobotomy, the radical mastetctomy, arthroscopic 
knee surgery for arthritis, X-ray screening for lung cancer, proton pump inhibitors for breast 
cancer, to name just a few, have ultimately been shown to be unnecessary, ineffective, more 
dangerous than imagined, or sometimes more deadly than the diseases they were intended to 
treat. 
Id. 
 7.  DAVID A. SQUIRES, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, EXPLAINING HIGH HEALTH CARE 
SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF SUPPLY, UTILIZATION, 
PRICES, AND QUALITY 4–5 (2012), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/ 
Publications/Issue%20Brief/2012/May/1595_Squires_explaining_high_hlt_care_spending_intl_brief.pdf.   
 8.  Maggie Fox, What makes U.S. Health Care So Overpriced? It’s Not What You Think, NBC 
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2013, 11:44 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/what-makes-u-s-health-
care-so-overpriced-its-not-f2D11582695 (quoting a study by Hamilton Moses of the Alerion Institute 
and Johns Hopkins University). 
 9.  Ezra Klein, Why an MRI cost $1,080 in America and $280 in France, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 
2012, 12:08 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/why-an-mri-costs-1080-in-
america-and-280-in-france/2011/08/25/gIQAVHztoR_blog.html.  
 10.  Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insurance—And 
Not Getting It, 21 HEALTH AFF. 88, 92–93 (2002).  
 11.  Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Varduhi Petrosyan, It's The Prices, Stupid: Why The 
United States Is So Different From Other Countries, 22(3) HEALTH AFFAIRS 89, 91 (2003). 
 12.  Gross domestic product (expenditure approach)—Per head, US $, current prices, current PPPs, 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, (May 25, 2014), 
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$8,508, $4,495, and $4,522, respectively.13 It is not unimaginable that $4,000 of 
that roughly $10,000 gap would rationally be spent on the health sector. It is 
hard to enjoy much else if one’s health is poor. 
On the other hand, the typical patient in the United States is not obtaining 
demonstrably better outcomes in exchange for the extra spending. U.S. life 
expectancy is about the same as that prevailing in countries like Canada and 
Germany. Other aspects of quality of care (such as wait times for doctors) are 
not noticeably better in the United States either.14 So it is hard to excuse the 
higher U.S. expenditures as the cost of quality. Nor do they appear to reflect 
direct consumer choice, given that so much health spending is involuntary (no 
one chooses to get sick) and is channeled through third-party payers. 
The mediation of most health care spending in the United States—by 
physicians (who stand between patients and treatment options), insurers (who 
stand between patients and doctors), and employers and government entities 
(who stand between patients and insurers)—leads to a fundamental divide on 
the explanation of higher U.S. costs. For mainstream American economists, the 
central problem is that government regulation and subsidies distort the 
outcomes that a “normal” market would provide.15 Victor Fuchs (an academic 
“sometimes called the dean of American health care economists,” according to 
New York Times economics journalist David Leonhardt) frequently evokes 
what he takes to be normal market goods as comparators for health care. “If 
there were third-party payments for personal computers, expenditures for PCs 
would surely be greater than at present. Even if consumers did not purchase 
more computers, many would be tempted to purchase top-of-the-line models,” 
Fuchs argues, in an article meant to explain why health care expenditures are 
inappropriately high.16 That leads to even more of what he deems distortions to 
“offset overutilization of health care” by imposing constraints like “fixed 
budgets for hospitals and physicians, quantitative limits on supplies of personnel 
and facilities, and alternative payment mechanisms such as capitation.”17 
Conventional economists tend to derogate these tactics, which they see as 
troubling deviations from ideal-typical free markets. In their place, they 
 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=218.  
 13.  OECD Health Data 2014—Frequently Requested Data, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2014). 
      14.    Karen Davis, Kristof Stremikis, David Squires, & Cathy Schoen, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, 
2014 Update: How the U.S. Health Care System Compares Internationally, THE COMMONWEALTH 
FUND (June 16, 2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2014/jun/mirror-
mirror. 
 15.  The scare quotes around the word “normal” are meant to denote the diversity of arrangements 
commonly called “markets.” There are standard markets for given commodities and services, but it is 
very difficult to identify underlying unities for all such markets. 
 16.  Victor Fuchs, Health Care Is Different—That’s Why Expenditures Matter, 303 JAMA 1859, 
1859 (2010). 
 17.  Id. 
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propose various mechanisms (such as vouchers or health savings accounts) 
designed to bring American health care closer to what they deem a true market. 
Far less represented in American health policy debates are comparative 
health law scholars who locate American health expenditure exceptionalism 
precisely in its health care system’s more market-oriented—or, at least, profit-
oriented—nature. Other industrialized nations’ health care systems tend to 
feature deeper government involvement in the provision of care, the regulation 
of insurance, and guarantees of access to care. Direct price controls are far 
more common. In the United States, the profit motive has a much larger role in 
the provision of care. Many changes in the delivery and organization of health 
care services over the past two decades have come about in part (and 
sometimes, primarily) to boost compensation to top executives and 
shareholders of insurers, and well-placed providers. 
It is this fundamental clash over values—over whether the profit motive and 
markets should play a larger or smaller role in U.S. health care—that rhetoric of 
“cost containment” tries to smooth over. Settling this key question will, in turn, 
depend on fine-grained analyses of diverse actors in the U.S. health care system. 
The next section frames a research agenda for such analyses, highlighting the 
importance of raising returns to undercompensated providers of care, even if 
there is a fair amount of waste by other providers. 
III 
TOWARD A MORE TEXTURED ANALYSIS OF HEALTH CARE EXPENSES 
Aggregate health spending figures are problematic. Such figures roll 
together expenditures on items that have been overpriced (like the drug 
Zaltrap, which was initially priced twice as high as Avastin with little to no 
discernible advantage over the older drug)18 with other interventions that are 
underfunded (like health information technology, personalized medicine, home 
health aides, care coordination, public health measures, and preventive care).19 
They combine extraordinary profits and executive incomes together with the 
pittances paid to vital workers in the sector. To achieve a more textured and 
accurate view, where health care funds are being spent must be considered as 
well as who is benefiting from those expenditures and what the distribution of 
income is across health subsectors. 
Given careful consideration of the full range of real health care costs (and 
their benefits), it is by no means clear that the United States is “spending too 
 
 18.  See Paul Goldberg, MSKCC Bars Zaltrap From Formulary, Triggering Debate Over Drug 
Pricing, 38 THE CANCER LETTER 1, 1–2 (2012); Matthew Herper, Sanofi’s CEO On The New York 
Times’ Criticism of Drug Prices And Surviving The Patent Cliff, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2012, 10:14 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/10/26/sanofis-ceo-on-the-new-york-times-criticism-of-
drug-prices-and-surviving-the-patent-cliff/; Andrew Pollack, Sanofi Halves Price of Cancer Drug 
Zaltrap After Sloan-Kettering Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, at B3.  
 19.  For an analysis of the undervaluation of home health care, see ROBERT KUTTNER, OBAMA’S 
CHALLENGE 146–53 (2012) (calling for professionalization and pay increases in the sector).   
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much” on all forms of health care. As Enthoven and Kronick noted in 1989, the 
American health care system is a “paradox of excess and deprivation,” far more 
in need of redistribution of expenditures than overall cuts.20  
Hospitals exemplify the problem. They occupy an odd place in health 
reform literature. For many cost-cutters, they are  public enemy number one: 
sites of unforgivable waste and unwise cross-subsidization.21 And yet 
policymakers are also counting on them to deliver “health system 
transformation,” via initiatives ranging from accountable care organizations to 
patient-centered medical homes. These two strands of advocacy could combine 
into a seamless garment, if hectoring over high costs inevitably spurred hustle to 
improve services. Unfortunately, hospitals may need to invest much more in 
information technology (IT) and innovative care delivery now in order to save 
money in the future. Cutting spending on, say, health IT, over the next few 
years may make it impossible to carry out the type of comparative effectiveness 
research and quality improvement strategies that would avoid unnecessary 
expense in the future. 
The real challenge for health policy is to better match the economic returns 
to health interventions to the benefit they provide. At present, for many 
interventions, it is hard to determine whether they reliably increase length and 
quality of life. In advertising, this has been a familiar problem: in the pre-
Internet age, it was often said that “half of ad spending is wasted; we just don’t 
know which half.” With the rise of Google, Facebook, and sophisticated ad 
networks, that is less and less true: databases record click-through rates and 
track customer engagement with ever more specificity. But unlike Silicon 
Valley’s hypertechnologized world of online ad delivery, health care IT is mired 
in interoperability problems.22 Moreover, even if these IT problems were 
overcome tomorrow, the world of health care outcomes is far more difficult to 
measure than the usual tasks of the Internet economy. Google can quickly 
determine whether, say, a blue background for ads leads to more clicks than a 
grey background. But how easily can a given hospital, or many hospitals, 
combine data to assess the effect of changing practice patterns? Finally, the 
relative value of various health care outcomes can be contestable, as 
controversy over Oregon’s famous Medicaid rationing experiment showed. 
There is some hope that a combination of health information exchange, 
interoperability advances, and more widespread adoption of learning health 
 
 20.  Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s, 320 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 29, 29 (1989).   
 21.  On the role of cross-subsidization, see see Frank Pasquale, Ending the Specialty Hospital Wars, 
in FRAGMENTATION IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 236 (Einer Elhauge, ed., 2010).  
 22.  Susan D. Hall, Poor interoperability a significant barrier for ACOs, FIERCEHEALTHIT, 
http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/poor-interoperability-significant-barrier-acos/2014-09-25 (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2014); Susan D. Hall, ACOs' Health IT Capabilities Remain Tudimentary, 
FIERCEHEALTHIT, (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/acos-health-it-capabilities-
remain-rudimentary/2014-08-13. 
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care system models will lead to the types of personalized medicine that can 
maintain or promote quality while cutting costs. The HITECH Act of 2009 has 
advanced adoption of health information technology, and the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) prescribed accountable care 
organizations (among many other programs) to encourage data-driven 
evaluation of health care.23 Nevertheless, there is still a great distance between 
the rhetoric of books like The End of Illness and the more mundane realities of 
health information sharing.24 Indeed, dozens of humbler interventions designed 
merely to stop errors remain inexcusably underutilized in most hospitals. If 
there is not strong demand for existing technologies of harm reduction, it is 
hard to see insurers driving far more ambitious innovation. 
Indeed, some safety net hospitals seem desperate for cash infusions to 
maintain basic care. In 2008, a report on the Grady Memorial Hospital in 
Atlanta revealed that: 
Every week or so, a vehicle simply gives out while in transit, and [the supervisor] prays 
that the patient will not die before she can orchestrate a rescue. . . . The orthopedic 
department has a waiting list for elective procedures that one doctor quantified as 
“infinity.” Its doctors intermittently instruct other departments to not send them 
patients.25 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was widely hailed as financial salvation for 
such hospitals since it was supposed to provide Medicaid coverage for a high 
proportion of the poor uninsured. But the Supreme Court insisted that states 
had the right not to implement that part of the ACA and to stick with the old 
“categorical eligibility” design of Medicaid.26 Even worse, in part to satisfy the 
technocratic cost-cutters at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and in the 
Obama Administration, the ACA cut Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) 
payments to hospitals like Grady on the assumption that the revenues from the 
population covered by the Medicaid expansion would make up the lost 
payments.27 So now Grady and similarly situated hospitals must make do with 
declining DSH payments and less than the promised Medicaid expansion. 
Even in states that are expanding Medicaid, many hospitals are at the 
 
 23.  Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 
Maryland Law Review 682, 728 (2013). 
 24.  DAVID B. AGUS, THE END OF ILLNESS 3 (2011) (“The end of illness is closer than you 
think.”).   
 25.  Shaila Dewan & Kevin Sack, A Safety-Net Hospital Falls Into Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/us/08grady.html.  
 26.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2601–07 (2012). 
 27.  The CBO deserves special censure for its role as an ideological “enforcer” of cost-cutting, 
systematically skewing legislators against government action, and under-recognizing the value of 
relieving suffering, offering security, and enriching the health and education of citizens. For the CBO, 
the working poor, the uninsured, and students are systematically undervalued. See Will Bunch, 
America’s Cruel Political Math—Where the Working Poor Equal Less Than Zero, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 25, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/will-bunch/minimum-wage-working-
poor_b_4844606.html; Frank Pasquale, Politicized Prognostication at CBO, BALKINIZATION (July 28, 
2009), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/07/politicized-prognostication-at-cbo.html.  
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breaking point. As one New York hospital executive observed, community 
hospitals have “cut costs on staffing and support services,” and stopped 
“spending money to keep . . . physical plant[] and equipment up to date,” to the 
extent that “[t]he condition of the physical plants of many New York City 
hospitals is staggering.”28 When local hospitals close, the resulting 
unemployment devastates local economies and sometimes leaves the critically 
ill with very long ambulance rides to emergency care.29 A new online game 
dramatizes the situation, “[h]aving players experience the anxiety of seeing a 
victim with no hospitals nearby” in order to give “them an intuitive and 
memorable understanding of how the lack of emergency care affects 
neighborhoods.”30 
For now, the worst deprivation resulting from health care cost-cutting 
afflicts the poorest parts of the United States the most. But the reduction in 
hospital facilities and other resources, although “efficient” in normal times, may 
prove disastrous if there is an epidemic. For example, one national-
preparedness plan for pandemic flu estimated that, in a worst-case scenario, the 
United States would be short over 600,000 ventilators.31 “To some experts, the 
ventilator shortage is the most glaring example of the country’s lack of 
readiness for a pandemic,” one journalist noted.32 The lack of “surge capacity” 
throughout the health care industry is a major infrastructural shortcoming, 
likely to cause tremendous, avoidable suffering if a pandemic emerges.33  
In the hoped-for world of the health care cost-cutter, doctors will scale back 
their own demands for reimbursement to match patients’ ability to pay, if only 
policymakers would bite the bullet and reduce patients’ effective purchasing 
power.34 Unfortunately, this “just-so” story has little foundation in actual studies 
of the redistributive effects of ending subsidies. It is hard to know whether the 
reduced purchasing power of working people (or their employers) would 
actually (motivate insurers to) force physicians and pharmaceutical firms to 
accept lower prices.35 If offered lower prices from ordinary working people, 
 
 28.  Mark Levine, St. Vincent’s is the Lehman Brothers of Hospitals, N.Y. MAG.Oct. 17, 2010, 
http://nymag.com/news/features/68991/ (quoting a hospital executive).   
 29.  See Jon Nichol et al., The Relationship Between Distance to Hospital and Patient Mortality in 
Emergencies: An Observational Study, 24 EMERGENCY MED. J. 665 (2007). 
 30.  Sisi Wei et al., HeartSaver: Experimenting with News Games to Tell a Story, PROPUBLICA 
(Apr. 23, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.propublica.org/nerds/item/heartsaver-an-experiment-in-using-
news-games-to-tell-a-story. 
 31.  Don McNeil, Hospitals Short on Ventilators if Bird Flu Hits, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006),  
 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/national/12vent.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1142295570-
FVGWQZzHnI8Qy0EO3+gKUA&pagewanted=print.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Vickie J. Williams, Fluconomics: Preserving Our Hospital Infrastructure During and After a 
Pandemic, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 99, 132 (2007).    
 34.  Joseph Bankman et al., Reforming the Tax Preference for Employer Health Insurance, in TAX 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 43, 43–44 (2012) (alleging negative effects of ESI).  
 35.  White, infra note 69, at 42. 
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doctors may simply switch their efforts to high-end, cash-only boutique, or 
concierge, practices.36 Magazines like Medical Economics constantly suggest 
ways for physicians to maximize cash flow.37 Indeed, both trade journalists and 
economists have recognized the pervasiveness of physicians’ income 
maintenance.38 Like a balloon that, when squeezed in one part, pops out in 
another, physician incomes have a way of maintaining their overall volume.39 
Macrolevel analyses of health expenditures also need to contextualize 
physician compensation. Given the rapid rise of both incomes and wealth 
among the top 1% (and especially top 0.1%) of taxpayers, it should not be 
surprising when even the highest-paid physicians fight to maintain their relative 
position. A typical American orthopedist may make twice or three times what a 
Belgian orthopedist earns but is paid a trivial sum compared to many rentiers 
and managers with better working conditions, less educational investment, and 
less contribution to social welfare. Moreover, given the political influence of 
money, the outsized salaries of these financiers and CEOs do not merely mean 
that they enjoy more consumer goods. Rather, to the extent health care 
providers have less money to invest in campaigns and lobbying, they consign 
themselves to losing out in future political battles over the relative allocation of 
health care dollars among managers, investors, and providers. In an era of 
unconstrained campaign spending, investing in politicians is a critical business 
strategy.40  
 
 36.  See Peter A. Clark et al., Concierge Medicine: Medical, Legal and Ethical Perspectives, 7 
INTERNET J.L. HEALTHCARE & ETHICS 1, 1 (2010), available at http://ispub.com/IJLHE/7/1/7969; 
Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 269, 282 
(2010); Frank Pasquale, Three Faces of Retainer Care, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 39, 41 
(2007).  
 37.  See Frank Cohen, Lines of Credit: A Tool to Boost Reserves and Sustain Cash Flow at Your 
Practice, MED. ECON. (Apr. 24, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-
economics/content/tags/cash-flow/lines-credit-tool-boost-reserves-and-sustain-cash-flow-your; Marisa 
Manley, Using Your Office Lease to Manage Cash Flow, MED. ECON. (May 23, 2014), 
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/content/tags/cash-flow/using-your-
office-lease-manage-cash-flow; Stanley M. Smith II & Matthew Frooman, Selling Your Practice: 
Planning Is Crucial-How to Maximize After-Tax Cash Flow, MED. ECON. (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/modernmedicine/modern-
medicine-feature-articles/selling-your-practice-plannin?page=full; Christina Van Vort, How Physicians 
Can Improve Cash Flow with Accounts Receivable Financing, MED. ECON. (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/content/tags/accounts-
receivable/how-physicians-can-improve-cash-flow-accounts-rec.  
 38.  See, e.g., Lori Melichar, The effect of reimbursement on medical decision making: Do physicians 
alter treatment in response to a managed care incentive?, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 902, 906 (2009) (finding 
that physicians “with capitated care contracts make treatment decisions that are not inconsistent with 
profit-maximization”); Karen Nash, Urologists Struggle to Make up for Lost Reimbursement, 
UROLOGY TIMES, June 2005, at 38 (discussing the ways urologists attempted to maintain their incomes 
in response to Medicaid reimbursement cuts).  
 39.  The phenomenon may express itself either as a maintenance of overall income, or income per 
patient or per hour. See, e.g., Jack Hadley & Jean M. Mitchell, Effects of HMO Market Penetration on 
Physicians’ Work Effort and Satisfaction, 16 HEALTH AFF. 99, 109 (1997). 
 40.  See generally JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE PREDATOR STATE: HOW CONSERVATIVES 
ABANDONED THE FREE MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD TOO (2008); G. RICHARD SHELL, 
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The financing of medical education (and even of medical residencies) also 
helps explain why American physicians demand more pay than those in other 
nations with similar levels of professionalism and health outcomes. Medical 
school in the United States leaves many of its doctors far deeper in debt at the 
beginning their careers than comparable professionals elsewhere. For example, 
if a primary care physician is using forty percent of her income to pay student 
debt and interest on a mortgage, we may wonder whether the differential 
between what she makes and the lower pay she would likely earn in another 
advanced country is really a problem of a wasteful health care sector, or, at least 
in part, a problem of U.S. patterns of financing education and housing. Leaving 
physicians hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt at the beginning of their 
careers is penny-wise and pound-foolish: it saves funds now, but pressures 
doctors to maximize incomes as rapidly as possible to pay back loans. 
Finally, close consideration of the potentially self-defeating role of private 
insurers as gatekeeping cost-cutters is crucial. U.S. doctors spend four times as 
much money on interactions with insurers as Canadian doctors.41 Multispecialty 
group practices “spend 13.9% of revenues for billing- and insurance-related 
overhead.”42 Private health insurers were supposed to control costs, and did play 
some role in doing so in the 1990s, but they have lately come to be seen as cost 
centers themselves. The ACA now imposes a medical loss ratio (MLR) rule to 
limit most insurers’ administrative take to fifteen to twenty percent of 
premiums paid.43 But insurers may respond by increasing premiums to expand 
the baseline of funds from which they can draw that fifteen or twenty percent. If 
that happens, the MLR may end up yet another futile technocratic cog in our 
health system’s Rube Goldberg machine of cost containment.44 
IV 
REVALUING VS. DEVALUING HEALTH CARE 
Shimon Peres once observed that, when a problem cannot be solved, it is no 
longer a problem—it is a fact.45 For many Americans, mortgage payments or 
 
MAKE THE RULES OR YOUR RIVALS WILL (2004).  
 41.  Dante Morra et al., US Physician Practices Versus Canadians: Spending Nearly Four Times As 
Much Money Interacting With Payers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1443, 1443 (2011). For concrete examples of the 
inefficiencies involved, see Steven P. Ringel, Practicing Medicine Versus Pushing Paper, 30 HEALTH 
AFF. 1200, 1200–03 (2011). 
 42.  Ray E. Drasga & Lawrence H. Einhorn, Why Oncologists Should Support Single Payer 
National Health Insurance, J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. (2013), available at http://org.salsalabs.com/o/307/ 
images/Drasga%20Einhorn%20authors%20proof-edited%20%281%29.pdf. 
 43.  Medical Loss Ratio, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/Medical-Loss-
Ratio.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
 44.  See Mike Konczal, What Kind of Problem is the ACA Rollout for Liberalism?, NEXT NEW 
DEAL (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/what-kind-problem-aca-rollout-
liberalism. 
 45.  Sharon’s Victory, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2001, at A26 (“If a problem has no solution, it may not 
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high cable bills or bank fees are simply assumed as an inevitable part of 
contemporary civilization, whereas health costs are politicized, manipulable, 
and thus more objectionable. For example, in Deadly Spin, ex-insurance 
executive Wendell Potter describes a struggling middle class family’s financial 
travails as follows: 
[The Brennan family is] thinking now that they would be better off without insurance. 
They pay more than $7,000 a year in premiums and still have almost $11,000 in 
combined deductibles—and they have to pay the full cost of prescription drugs 
because medications are not covered under either of their policies. “Because of the 
high deductibles, we still wind up paying for everything out of pocket,” said Katie. 
“We now avoid going to the doctor. . . . The cost of our premiums and out-of-pocket 
costs exceed our monthly mortgage payments.”
46
 
Two questions immediately arise here. First, why are costs so high? That 
should be the first question of health care cost-cutters, not generalizations 
about whether the service as a whole costs too much. Second, what are the 
proper comparators for health care costs? The Brennans complain that the costs 
exceed a mortgage payment—but to what extent is the real estate sector itself 
inflated by government action?47 Like medical bills, housing prices are artifacts 
of socialized financing mechanisms. Housing also has enormous built-in tax 
advantage for the tens of millions of American households that own homes and 
are paying a mortgage: the interest payments on the mortgage are tax-
deductible. All these subsidies are submerged in ordinary talk about real estate, 
which presumes that rents or mortgage payments should be a family’s largest 
expense.48 
This is not to say that the Brennans should not be complaining about their 
plight: far from it. My position is simply that all wasted spending is relative. In 
the aggregate, useless spending on American health care may well surpass the 
over $600 billion estimated by Wallace Turbeville to be excessively allocated to 
the finance sector each year.49 For example, the Institute of Medicine issued a 
report in the fall of 2012 claiming that $750 billion of the $2.6 trillion the United 
States spent on health care was unnecessary.50 Nevertheless, even accepting such 
 
be a problem, but a fact, not to be solved, but to be coped with over time.”).  
 46.  WENDELL POTTER, DEADLY SPIN 102 (2010). 
 47.  See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1103–04 (2009) (describing subsidies to housing market and financial, insurance, 
and real estate (FIRE) sector).  
 48.  See generally SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT 
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011) (discussing the role of hidden subsidies and 
tax discounts in redistributive policies).  
 49.  Wallace C. Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial Regulation: 
Inefficiency of Capital Intermediation in a Deregulated System, 72 MD. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (2013); see 
also John Quiggin, Wall Street Isn’t Worth It, JACOBIN (2013), available at https://www.jacobinmag.com/ 
2013/11/wall-street-isnt-worth-it/.   
 50.  See Sarah Kliff, We spend $750 billion on unnecessary health care. Two charts explain why, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2012, 11:07 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
wonkblog/wp/2012/09/07/we-spend-750-billion-on-unnecessary-health-care-two-charts-explain-why/; 
The Cost of Health Care: How Much is Waste?, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, http://resources.iom.edu/ 
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are about as scientific as singularitarian predictions of mass immortality by 
2100.  
Even ostensibly sober analysts have tended to “sound the alarm” on health 
care costs with some dubious predictions. For example, the Intermediate 
Projections from Annual Reports of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal 
Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds 
have frequently foretold doom for the Medicare Part A Trust Fund.53 In 1970, 
the fund was supposed to be depleted by 1972; doom was just six years away in 
1993; and in 1998, calamity loomed in 2008.54 The CBO has also repeatedly 
overestimated the budgetary threat posed by rising government spending on 
health care.55 Sometimes, these overestimates border on the ghoulish. For 
example, the CBO has embraced the concept of “survivors’ costs” in some 
scoring of legislative proposals.56 Such analysis essentially values the early death 
of a person denied coverage for care as a benefit (or, at least, avoided costs) to 
the public fisc. Beyond its defective moral foundations, such cost alarmism can 
prove self-undermining by pushing more health care provision into the private 
sector, where insurers have repeatedly proven less able to control costs than 
their purely public-sector counterparts.57 
The wisest commentators on health care costs concede that “[t]here is, of 
course, no ‘right’ amount for a society to spend on health care.”58 Others 
nevertheless focus on disparities among nations with similar lifespans as the 
United States.59 Clark C. Havighurst has argued that “it is facially troublesome 
that health care spending represents one-seventh of GDP in the United States 
(even without providing fully for a huge segment of the population) while 
 
 53.  Kaiser Family Foundation, Rhyme or Reason?: Solvency Projections of the  
Medicare Part A Trust Fund, 1970–2010 (2010) (health resource data set compiling intermediate 
projections from 1970–2010 Annual Reports of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital 
Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds) (on file with author).  
 54.  PATRICIA A. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICARE: INSOLVENCY PROJECTIONS 4 
(2013), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20946.pdf  
 55.  See Pasquale, Politicized Prognostication, supra note 27 (discussing examples of the CBO 
overestimating health care expenses and the unreliability of CBO estimates).   
 56.  Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1555, 1597 (2007) (quoting CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
BENEFIT FOR MEDICARE 33 (2002), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/39xx/ 
doc3960/10-30-prescriptiondrug.pdf (In describing why its model included costs but no savings from 
new access to pharmaceuticals, the CBO said, inter alia, “[T]o the extent that a drug benefit helps 
people live longer, they may consume more health care over their remaining lifetime than they would 
have without the benefit.” In other words, it is still cheaper for Medicare beneficiaries to die.).   
 57.  See Frank Pasquale, Health Care Dilemma: Cost Control vs. Profit Maximization, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 10, 2008), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/02/ 
health_care_cos.html.  
 58.  Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Policing Cost Containment:  The Medicare Peer Review Organization 
Program, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 483, 484 (1991). 
 59.  See id. (comparing the percent of U.S. GDP spent on health care to that of Canada, Germany, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom).   
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accounting for only a ninth of GDP or less in all other developed nations.”60 But 
the “percentage of overall GDP” alarm has been sounded many times in the 
past. For example, in 1980, an economist lamented that “[w]e spend about 9% 
of our gross national product on personal health care.”61 He would probably 
have predicted disaster for the United States if he knew that the spending level 
was on its way up to its current status of about eighteen percent of GDP. But 
however badly off the United States may be at present, it is relatively clear that 
the crisis was primarily triggered by the financial, not the health, sector. Growth 
in health employment over the past decade has been one of the few bright spots 
in an otherwise gloomy macroeconomic picture.62 And it would be the height of 
insensitivity to tell millions of unpaid family caregivers that they should be 
denied some care assistance simply because an abstraction like “health 
expenditures” has grown too large. 
Societies’ needs and wants change over time. There is little reason to 
benchmark proper health care spending levels to some arbitrary year in the 
past, or even some arbitrary global benchmark—particularly when U.S. GDP is 
higher than that prevailing in so many of the cost-cutters’ favored comparators. 
Future increases in health expenditures, and even increases in the share of 
national income they consume, do not automatically undermine the typical 
household’s well-being—and may well enhance it.63 With a sufficiently long view 
of economic transitions, radical changes in societal allocation of resources 
appear more natural than ossified stability. If the U.S. workforce in agriculture 
could decline precipitously in a matter of decades, why should its labor in health 
care not rise by, say, twenty or thirty percent over the course of the twenty-first 
century? And why would a corresponding capture of that share of GDP for 
such workers be so problematic if it were accompanied by a commensurately 
diminishing share for rentiers, landlords, energy barons, and communication 
magnates? 
Indeed, resisting such a development may prove macroeconomically self-
defeating. To give one striking example: a Rand study recently concluded that 
the “total opportunity costs of informal elder-care amount to $522 billion 
annually.”64 The study suggests that a combination of unskilled and skilled 
 
 60.  Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
55, 81 (2002).  He also notes that“[s]everal whole percentage points of the nation’s gross domestic 
product (‘GDP’) are thus diverted wastefully to health care from other uses.”  Id. at 79. 
 61.  Ralph L.  Andreano, Does America Spend Too Much on Health Care?, 56 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. 
MED. 19, 19 (1980), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1808285/pdf/ 
bullnyacadmed00110-0023.pdf. 
 62.  See Catherine A. Wood, Employment in Health Care: A Crutch for the Ailing Economy During 
the 2007-09 Recession, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 2011, at 13. 
 63.  DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR AMERICA’S 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 74 (2005) (projecting that the typical household is expected to earn $75,000 
annually by mid-century and that, even if 25% of that annual income were consumed by insurance and 
direct medical expenses, the household would still be better off).  
 64.  A.V. Chari, John Engberg, Kristin Ray, Ateev Mehrotra, The Opportunity Costs of Informal 
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replacement care could result in net economic gains for the United States. Such 
replacement care would increase “health care costs,” but could lead to net 
economic gains overall, particularly for women (who disproportionately 
shoulder the burden of unpaid caregiving). A policy debate relentlessly focused 
on reducing health expenditures may promote self-defeating savings strategies, 
as obvious, immediate savings are eventually overwhelmed by later, hidden 
costs. How we choose to measure benefits and costs can spotlight some results 
and submerge others.65 Even accounting is political. 
The dynamic, long-term effects of short-term cost-cutting measures like 
consolidation are also understudied.66 A wave of hospital mergers in the 1990s 
helped increase concentration in the industry.67 Merging hospitals probably 
saved administrative costs and achieved other efficiencies in the short run.68 But 
over time, the biggest hospitals and hospital chains have also leveraged their 
size into bargaining power vis-à-vis insurers, employers, and patients.69 Joseph 
White has described in grim detail the arms race for size among hospitals and 
insurers.70 It is much easier for large insurers to pass along cost increases to 
employers than to bargain hard with must-have providers. Massive hospital 
systems have unleashed untold ingenuity in figuring out how to bill payers more 
aggressively for their services.71 Some have earned their investors princely 
sums.72 These outsized returns might be more properly considered finance 
 
Elder-Care in the United States: New Estimates from the American Time Use Survey, HEALTH SERVICES 
RESEARCH, DOI: 10.1111/1475-6773.12238 (2014), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
external_publications/EP66196.html (copy on file with author and shared with journal). 
 65.  SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011) (arguing that many upper income individuals do not 
realize the extent to which their lifestyles are subsidized by “upside down subsidies,” like the home 
mortgage interest deduction, that tend to deliver benefits disproportionately to the wealthiest (who 
tend to have the largest mortgages)).  
 66.  See generally FINAL REPORT, NEW JERSEY COMMISSION ON RATIONALIZING HEALTH CARE 
RESOURCES (2008), available at http://nj.gov/health/rhc/finalreport/documents/entire_finalreport.pdf .   
 67.  WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT, HOW HAS HOSPITAL 
CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HEALTHCARE 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-research/2006/02/how-has-hospital-consolidation-
affected-the-price-and-quality-of.html. 
 68.  For an account of varying strategies of efficiency improvement in hospital reorganization, see 
Frank Pasquale, Ending the Specialty Hospital Wars, in FRAGMENTATION IN AMERICAN HEALTH 
CARE (Einer Elhauge, ed., 2010).  
 69.  Joseph White, Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005, 85 MILBANK Q. 395, 
435 (2007).  
 70.  Id. at 419.  
 71.  Julie Creswell & Reed Abelson, Giant Hospital Chain Creates a Windfall for Private Equity, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/15/business/hca-giant-hospital-chain-
creates-a-windfall-for-private-equity.html. Bain Capital and two other private equity firms bought 
HCA in 2006, and tripled the value of their holdings in six years. Id. Again, the accounting question 
arises: to what extent are HCA’s extraordinary profits health care costs, and to what extent are they 
rents to finance?  
 72.  See, e.g., id. 
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whatever 1% or so of their income works out to, but that may be cold comfort if 
one of them finds herself consigned to a hollowed-out tier of a health care 
system highly stratified by cost-cutting. 
For many of the health care cost-cutters, it is simply obvious that any money 
saved on health care would go to more socially valuable ends. Employer-
sponsored insurance is one example: cost-cutters simply assume that most of the 
money saved would go to workers to spend on what they will. Rarely, if ever, is 
it acknowledged that, in the current climate of mass un- and underemployment, 
employers themselves are likely to keep the money. The average employee has 
little to no bargaining power.76 
Health care cost-cutters may claim that the firms’ residual claimants to 
returns on equity deserve ever-larger shares of revenues relative to the 
providers and insurers the firms directly and indirectly pay for health care. So 
what is wrong with piling more funds into corporate cash piles? Consider the 
distribution of financial assets, like shares in firms, in U.S. society. As of 2010, 
about 85% of financial wealth was held by only 10% of Americans; the top 1% 
owned a staggering 34% of financial wealth.77 Should we really be rushing to 
reallocate money from home health aides, nurses, physicians, pharmacists, 
dentists, and drug researchers to the small fraction of Americans who own most 
financial assets? 
Some of those with the most financial wealth are using their resources to 
promote political programs that advocate for slashing Medicare and Medicaid 
to “cut the deficit,” while they rarely, if ever, broach the possibility of taxing the 
wealthiest at rates that prevailed in the United States as recently as the 1950s.78 
Initiatives to cut health care costs are often less a neutral, technocratic project 
of rationalizing public expenditure than one cog in a larger machine of upward 
wealth redistribution: away from patients and professionals on the frontlines of 
care, to an investor class that can pay for the best health care in the world 
without any public help or insurance pool to supplement their purchasing 
power. 
Popular as it may be among technocrats, the deficit reduction narrative has 
already failed once before. Former President Bill Clinton helped engineer a 
balanced budget in the late 1990s, and even experienced a federal budget 
surplus. The next administration promptly squandered that money on tax cuts 
 
 76.  See David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, The Regressivity of Taxing Employer-Paid 
Health Insurance, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. e101, e101 (2009). 
 77.  G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, at 
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html. On this page, Figure 1: Net worth and 
financial wealth distribution in the U.S. in 2010 shows that the top 10% of households (with a mean net 
worth of about $2 million) have 85% of financial wealth in the United States. Id. Wealth has only 
become more concentrated since then.  
 78.  Such programs include Fix the Debt, The Can Kicks Back, or others from the billionaire Pete 
Peterson’s Institute for International Economics.  See FIX THE DEBT, http://www.fixthedebt.org/ (last 
visited July 27, 2014); THE CAN KICKS BACK, http://www.thecankicksback.org/ (last visited July 27, 
2014). 
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primarily benefitting the wealthiest and, a bit later, a multitrillion dollar 
commitment in Iraq. If the ACA does manage to cut federal health care 
budgets by 2020, America may well see surpluses again turned into deficits in 
ill-fated military campaigns. Simply “cutting deficits,” without some positive 
and durable sense of where the money is going, merely gives hostages to 
fortune. 
It would be far better to redirect current energies in health care cost-cutting 
toward quality improvement, which would both cut wasteful spending and 
redirect that saved money (and perhaps other funds) to the multiple 
underserved populations now documented in health disparities literatures, and 
the many initiatives in personalized medicine, health IT, and medical research 
that are now inadequately funded. For example, the United States is rapidly 
running out of effective antibiotics, leading some experts to worry about the 
advent of a postantibiotic era where minor wounds could spiral into long 
hospital stays, or even death, for those infected with drug-resistant microbes.79 
Spending more on antibiotic research now could prevent far more costs in the 
future.  
It is not just drug research that suffers in a health austerity regime. 
Governmental refusals to pay for current drugs may backfire, too.80 If a high co-
pay leads a congestive heart failure patient to skip critical medications, she 
might end up in an emergency department—a far costlier intervention. Finally, 
the recent rise of drug shortages should be a cautionary tale for anyone hoping 
that market forces will enforce just-in-time production patterns that minimize 
costs in other industries.81 A disrupted supply chain in car parts can cause 
remediable inconvenience. Shortages of critical drugs, by contrast, threaten to 
impose irreparable harm on those in need of treatment while rationing (or 
improvisation with second-best treatment regimens) must occur. 
B. Health Macroeconomics 
The health care sector is also anchoring the economic future of many 
regions. For many American urbanists and economic planners, the keys to the 
future of growth are “meds and eds.” Cities and regions with thriving 
universities and hospitals could emulate Pittsburgh, Ann Arbor, and other cities 
which have bounced back from manufacturing’s decline. On this vision, 
 
 79.  See Tom Worstall, Why We’re Running Out of Antibiotics is an Economic Problem, Not a 
Medical or Pharmaceutical One, FORBES (MAY 3, 2014, 12:15 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/05/03/why-were-running-out-of-antibiotics-is-an-
economic-problem-not-a-medical-or-pharmaceutical-one/; Anita Manning, ‘Superbugs’ Spread Fear Far 
and Wide, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at A1.  
 80.  Joel Lexchin,  Prescribing Errors, 172 CMAJ 1503, 1504 (2005) (“[W]hen New Hampshire put 
a cap on the monthly number of prescriptions that welfare recipients would get for free, the result was 
an increase in nursing home admissions that probably cost the state government as much as it saved on 
drug costs.”). 
 81.  Sharona Hoffman, The Drugs Stop Here: A Public Health Framework to Address the Drug 
Shortage Crisis, 67 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 1, 4–5 (2012). 
PASQUALE_BOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2014  2:13 PM 
190 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:171 
 
decently paid human services in the medical and education sectors could sustain 
employment and spark innovation. 
George Mason University economist Tyler Cowen offers a radically 
different vision in his recent book Average Is Over, revealing a troubling 
endgame for neoliberal health cost cutting.82 For Cowen, current trends toward 
economic inequality will swamp the meds and eds trend. There will be a 
prosperous class of the top ten or fifteen percent of society making over one 
million dollars a year, and a huge underclass with far fewer resources than the 
median household of today. Asked by a skeptical radio journalist how this 
transition would transpire in the United States without mass resistance or 
discontent, he nonchalantly points to income levels prevailing in poorer 
precincts of Latin America as a potential equilibrium point for the broad 
American middle class.83 Pressed to discuss the possibility of redistribution, 
Cowen dismissed it, pointing to the quiescence of the average U.S. citizen and 
the increasing influence of the very wealthy over the political process.84 Instead, 
he has urged policymakers to focus their attention on reducing the costs of 
health care and education, in order to preserve some level of access to these 
necessities to a radically poorer middle class. 
Cowen frames his position as a tough realism, a reluctant recognition of 
hard economic realities of scarcity. Yet there are many contestable links in the 
chains of causation that health care cost-cutters would use to justify binding the 
growth of health care spending. As long as there are hundreds of U.S. 
billionaires, thousands of hecto-millionaires, and trillions of dollars hidden 
offshore, throwing off untold (and improperly untaxed) sums for their wily 
owners, some funds are available to cover health cost overruns. America’s top 
one percent—enjoying over ninety percent of economic gains for years now, 
and a vastly disproportionate share of economic growth since 1980—cannot 
forever keep accumulating wealth without returning some fair share to 
accommodate the needs of the other 99%.  
The more foresighted among them must also realize that, at the end of the 
day, the most important threats to their own well-being—debilitating 
sicknesses, in the form of either acute or chronic disease—can only be 
 
 82.  See TYLER COWEN, AVERAGE IS OVER: POWERING AMERICA BEYOND THE AGE OF THE 
GREAT STAGNATION (2013); Tyler Cowen, Our Economic Problems Are in Sectors, Not the System, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/30/was-marx-
right/our-economic-problems-are-in-sectors-not-the-system (describing a “health care system which 
combines the worst properties of public and private sector incentives, leading to more expensive service 
and lower quality and access”).   
 83.  Economist Tyler Cowen on the End of Average, ON POINT (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://onpoint.wbur.org/2013/09/16/economist-tyler-cowen-on-the-end-of-average.     
 84.  Id. Operating from a very different set of assumptions, Sheldon Wolin would probably come to 
a similar conclusion. See Sheldon Wolin, Inverted Totalitarianism: How the Bush Regime is Effecting the 
Transformation to a Fascist-Like State, NATION, (May 1, 2003), http://www.thenation.com/ 
article/inverted-totalitarianism# (“[I]nverted totalitarianism wants a politically demobilized society that 
hardly votes at all.”).  
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alleviated, deflected, or delayed. Having hundreds of times more wealth than 
others is no route to a life hundreds of times longer. Indeed, the opposite may 
well be true: The uncared-for poor may be more likely to harbor or spread 
antibiotic-resistant microbes or viral contagions to others than they would be if 
they received adequate and timely health care. To the extent it worsens the fate 
of the one percent, health care cost-cutting may be a lose–lose game. Out-of-
control contagions would swamp whatever welfare gains the wealthy enjoy from 
persuading politicians to cut their taxes. 
Even if gated communities can guard the very wealthy from contagious 
disease, the upper classes still will need to rely on a larger health care system 
sustained by mass participation and demand. It is hard to imagine individuals, 
or even wealthy groups, stockpiling all drugs they might need, particularly the 
sterile injectables or biotech solutions that are critical to advanced medicine. 
Even the very wealthy must rely on a steady, more general demand for these 
products. They cannot just order them for instant delivery via Amazon. Public 
subvention—ranging from research grants to Medicare and Medicaid funding 
for the products research generates—provides that demand. Cutting it by 
providing ever-more tax breaks for the wealthy is an astonishingly short-sighted 
strategy, even for the richest. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Cost-cutting is a conveniently flexible summum bonum that can hide the 
often brutally reallocative measures taken to financialize health systems (that is, 
to maximize their ability to deliver returns to investors) or tier them (in order to 
stratify quality and availability of care on the basis of ability and willingness to 
pay). If the health care cost-cutters had a plan for reallocating excess health 
sector spending to pay for care that is now undercompensated or absent, they 
would merit the influence they have now achieved. But in reality, money freed 
up by cost-cutting is much more likely to be retained as profit or claimed by 
capital and rentiers in some other way. The “customer” for many private 
insurers is the corporation buying coverage for its employees, not the 
employees themselves (the insured). Reduce the cost of such insurance in an 
era of mass un- and under-employment, and guess who will capture those 
funds? One does not need to read Kalecki to guess which way the money flows. 
The cost-containment consensus obscures these unpleasant realities. It is an 
ideological touchstone of U.S. health care and key to reducing the field to a 
technocratic object. Establishment economists alarmedly pronounce on the 
horrors of spending over seventeen percent of GDP on health care, ignoring the 
repeated falsifications of predictions of doom when health expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP passed other, arbitrary thresholds. Health policymakers 
nevertheless tend to accept that framing, and busy themselves with finding the 
most wasteful providers. They rarely consider whether the outlier dermatologist 
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making $900,000 a year is as much of a misallocation of resources as, say, the 
hedge fund managers making hundreds of millions of dollars in a single year, or 
ever more richly compensated top managers and private equity firms.85 A 
goodly number of billionaires richly fund austerity-promoting think tanks that 
keep public debates focused on cost-cutting, rather than fairer pay for 
undercompensated health workers. 
Technocrats may cast my arguments as a “rhetoric of reaction” that 
overemphasizes the perverse and futile consequences of cost-cutting, unfairly 
occluding its more positive effects.86 But the question of emphasis may just as 
easily be reversed. In their eagerness to “rationalize” the health-delivery 
system, cost-cutters overlook (and threaten to wreck) the delicate ecology of 
current health care finance. My conservatism merely turns the rationalizing 
impulse of cost-cutting on itself: demanding that neoliberals show more 
evidence of the success of cost-cutting before erecting ever higher burdens of 
documentation (or ill-considered incentive schemes) for health care providers.87 
Cost-cutters constantly evoke waste and fraud as their targets, but their 
program also has real human costs. In The Body Economic, David Stuckler and 
Sanjay Basu demonstrate that endless pressure to cut public spending—
including health spending—has directly impacted life expectancy in Europe’s 
periphery.88 In the United States, new data shows that in many areas, white 
women’s life expectancy has gone down by close to five years.89 Once insurance 
and care become scarce or burdensome to seek out, people who are sickened by 
lack of health insurance, or are too hard-pressed to participate in politics, are in 
no position to fight back against the austerity juggernaut. Nor are they able to 
fight effectively for one policy that would have a decent chance of cutting costs 
while improving quality: a public option like Medicare for anyone without 
decent employer coverage. 
Having dismissed such real reforms as utopian nullities, neoliberals’ 
preferred brand of “cost-cutting” continues to dominate American health 
policy. The longer it holds sway, the more profit-driven, rather than patient-
driven, care promises to dominate the health care landscape. Financiers will 
 
 85.  LAWRENCE MISHEL & ALYSSA DAVIS, ECON. POLICY INST., CEO PAY CONTINUES TO RISE 
AS TYPICAL WORKERS ARE PAID LESS (June 12, 2014).  
 86.  ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 
(1991).  
 87.  As G.A. Cohen has observed, “with historical working class gains in place, small-c 
conservatism becomes a buffer against inequality. For the sake of protecting and extending the powers 
of wealth, big-C Conservatives [i.e., members of parties of the right] regularly sacrifice the small-c 
conservatism that many of them genuinely cherish.”  G.A. Cohen, A Truth in Conservatism: Rescuing 
Conservatism from the Conservatives 35 (A1-2004 Conservatism Workshop, 2004), available at 
https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/workshop-materials/pt_cohen.pdf.  
 88.  See generally DAVID STUCKLER & SANJAY BASU, THE BODY ECONOMIC: WHY AUSTERITY 
KILLS (2013). 
 89.   Emily Shire, The Mysterious Decline in Female Life Expectancy, THE WEEK (Oct. 9, 2013), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/250795/the-mysterious-decline-in-female-life-expectancy.  
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continue to wrest more control of the sector from physicians, nurses, scientists, 
and other frontline innovators and providers of care. Without a far more 
textured analysis of how dollars now devoted to health care can be better spent, 
rather than merely not spent, a dark future of stratification and 
deprofessionalization is all but assured. 
There is an alternative. Direct state investment in new technologies would 
advance all three of the “triple aims” of health policy (cost containment, 
enhancement of quality, and expanding access to care).90 Fully funding the Food 
and Drug Administration would help identify which interventions really work 
and which are mere money-spinners.91 Gradually expanding Medicare eligibility 
could lead to real competition for the private plans now offered on the ACA’s 
exchanges. Investment in learning health care systems and health data 
interoperability would provide a better infrastructure for medical research. 
Extensive training programs and fairer pay could lead to true 
professionalization of home health aides—workers now burdened with 
generally low pay and dismal prospects for career advancement. 
These goals may seem unrealistic now. But until our health policymakers 
directly aim for them, we will be at the mercy of a cost-containment model as 
flawed as pre-Copernican, geocentric astronomy. We can continue to add 
epicycles of exchanges, subsidies, risk corridors, navigators, clawbacks, and 
auditors to paper over the flaws in this neoliberal model of “health reform.” Or 
we can invest directly in patient-centered care. It may not cut costs, but over the 
long term, what could better assure Americans’ productivity and well-being? 
 
 
 90.  See generally MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC 
VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013). 
 91.  See BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND 
HARM PATIENTS 1–11 (2012) (discussing the problems associated with industry-funded testing); Frank 
Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 
668–772 (collecting studies on secrecy in the health context). 
